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Abstract.
The scientific literature that  studies  the Business  cycles  contains a historical  debate  
between random and deterministic models.  On the one hand, models built  with explanatory 
variables  follow a  stochastic  trajectory  and produce,  through transmission  mechanisms,  the 
studied cycles. Its rationale: the so-called Slutsky-Yule effect. In addition, models in which the 
system phase at time T fixes, applying the “ceteris paribus condition”, the phase  at time t + 1.  
The  cycle  would  be  the  product  of  variables,  making  it  possible  to  predict  and  enabling 
economic policies to combat recessions. The thesis of this work is as follows. The application of 
the theorems of Chaitin of undecidability shows that it is not possible to conclude such debate. 
It  is  impossible  to  determine  with absolute  certainty  whether  the  observed cycles  follow a 
deterministic or stochastic model. To reach this result, I outline the fundamental theories of the 
business cycle, providing a classification and examples of mathematical models. I review the 
definition of randomness, and I consider the demonstration of Chaitin about the impossibility of 
deciding  whether  a  data  set  is  stochastic  or  not.  A  consequence,  he  says,  of  Gödel 
incompleteness theorems. I conclude considering a string of economic data, aggregated or not,  
as random or deterministic, depends on the theory. This applies to all cyclical phenomena of any 
nature.  Specific  mathematical  models  have  observable  consequences.  But  probabilism  and 
determinism are only heuristic programs that guide the knowledge progress.
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AMS classification: 03F40.
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1.Probabilism and determinism in the Economic cycle theories.
The Economic cycle consists of the variations that the activity of attached economic variables , 
such as the national income or employment, have over time, around a long –term tendency from 
which diverts. This movement is given as in nominal values as, deflecting, in real quantities. 
The second characteristic of the cycle lays on the fact that different economic strings show a  
positive or negative correlation in the cycle. It means, there is an ensemble movement along the 
variations (Diebold and Rudebusch, 1996: 67). An outfit movement which appears from cycle 
to cycle. To sum up, the historic recurrence of fluctuation lets and requires a general theory of  
the cycle. Theory which explains and preferably predicts. 
However,  the cycles,  although are recurring,  are also irregulars in stage,  space and time of 
repetition. So, the existence of cyclic determined movements are in doubt and it makes, at least, 
difficult to design models which make possible the prediction. 
The cycle is,  as well,  a problematic feature, because the theory builds models in which the 
economic agents,  rationally acting, reach a position of balance among them. Why don´t the 
unstable cycles stop of repeating?
Can we establish a level  theory which lets  describe properly the different   observed cycles 
historically? Kingleberger (1985) denies it. However, I consider the Economic science moves 
forward with the constant attempt to refine general mathematical models to describe and predict 
with accuracy and generality, the economic events. Mathematics and modern science go hand 
by hand because Mathematics let know, forecast and promote the facts, and processes which 
wish being launched (Frey, 2972:177).
 
Being  the  business  cycle  theory  necessary,  an  agreement  has  not  been  reached  about  a 
conceptual and general mathematic model until now. Alternative research programs exist. In the 
scientific literature, there are, at least, three perspectives (Ekkehard and Stockhammer, 2003:1).
Keynesian theory of lack of effective aggregate demand, which explains the economic cycles as  
market failures due to rigidities in prices and/or salaries, or other factors, may reach a high 
involuntary unemployment. 
 Secondly, the classic theory of  return to the equilibrium of full employment throughout the  
operation of markets. Economy is always in a Walrasian equilibrium: combination of prices and 
quantities  which  simultaneously  equalize  supply  and  demand  in  the  different  markets  of 
economy. The economic agents decide maximize their settlement, in the temporary horizon,  
with possible restrictions in the production possibilities and limits of resources. 
The  business  cycle  is  explained  as  a  product  with  imperfections  of  market  (asymmetric 
information, doubt, oligopolies, public procedures) or random exogenous shocks which can not 
be provided (Tobin 1995: 32).  It  deals,  therefore,  about  unpredictable  exogenous factors  or 
institutional eliminable elements. Nothing substantial to the market. The economic agents act 
with  rational  expectations  and  choose  the  best  possible  positions.  The  markets  tend,  by 
themselves, to a balance where they get empty in natural rates.
Thirdly, Austrian theory, it is rather minor in the scientific literature, based on the alteration of 
intertemporal prices which are far from the preferences. Changes in the economic policy and/or 
modifications in bank credits which lead to different monetary interest types far from natural  
interest types and run into fluctuations by inefficient resource allocation. A correct monetary  
policy and institutional improvements, especially in the financial sector, can lead us to a world 
described by the classic theory.
The  classic  theory  says  only  the  prices  and  real  wages  determinate  the  real  quantities  of 
production and employment, because the agents understand the impact of the prices and they 
discount them. The economy is constantly in balance of the system of Walrasian equations. 
While the Keynesian theory is still postulating real classic equilibriums (Tobin 1995: 38) based 
on the equality of the marginal productivity and disutility of labor, determining real salaries,  
volume of employment and output. But in that point, the markets don’t empty and involuntary 
unemployment can exist. The economic cycles are persistent and can´t only be explained by the 
evolution of real variables. The explanatory key is the slow adjustment in prices and wages.  
Even though mechanisms have been suggested which will produce the same result even with a 
complete flexibility of prices and wages. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1086) research the general 
impact of externalities (institutional incomplete markets and with incomplete information) over 
the global economic balance. 
The current classic theory is called Real Business Cycles theory (RBC) or Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium models (DSGE). The key contributions are Kydland and Prescott (2982), 
Long  and  Plasser  (1983)  and  King,  Plosser  and  Rebelo  (1988).  They  are  introduced  in  a  
growing neoclassic model,  with rational  optimization by the agents,  random and exogenous 
factors as stimulus of the cycle. Mainly, technological shocks. 
The classic theory is of the equilibrium one in natural rates. The Keynesian theory is of the  
disequilibrium one in prices and quantities or equilibrium one without emptying. The classic  
theory states the dichotomy between real and nominal variables. The Keynesian one not.
The  cycle  theories  are  analyzed  and  put  into  groups  according  to  their  deterministic  or  
stochastic character. I will discuss whether the inclusion of endogenous or exogenous variables 
have  any  relation  with  this  character.  I  will  classify  the  theories  according  to  these  two 
judgements.
What is considered is whether the explanatory mathematic model of the observed cycles .means 
the equal to a short program which let us deduce the long program or data set. If from this set of  
variables, connected among equations, we can find out how the cycle has happened and will  
happen. We can predict it. 
Chaterjee (2000) states that  an evolution in  the economic cycle theory exits.  First  analysis  
would be  based on postulating factors which would produce determined fluctuations. Economic 
system factors which would develop peaks and crisis in an endogenous and unambiguous way. 
While later theories gave the cycles to the compound effect of random disturbances. Although 
the identification of these shocks would have been, until now, ambiguous or inaccurate. This 
author says an evolution appears from the first to the second way to explain the cycle and an  
almost current agreement about a string of random shocks are the key. Slutsky showed in the  
20s that random fluctuations can be at the base of the cycles. Later, Slutsky thesis or Slutske-
Yale  effect  are  analyzed.  In  a  similar  way,  Benhabid and Farmer  (1999)  say   the  Modern  
Macro-economy is based in DSGE models designed by the Real Economic cycles theory. In my 
opinion, however, both perspectives or stochastic and determinist programs coexist and debate 
(Mankiw, 1989) with various proposals of mathematic models.
The final thesis of this work lays on, due to the impossibility of giving a  empiric content to the 
concept of fate and determinism, the main discussion is unsolvable and it will always happen in 
the economic theory. Models will be provisionally accepted and others rejected, according to 
the theory and data, but not to the related ideas about fate or denial. 
2. A simple guideline to analyze the empirical application of economic theories.
When we states an event happens randomly, it is aimless, does this statement admit an empiric  
proof, or is it an unanswerable and irrefutable conclusion, from data?
The  criterion  used  to  know  if  a  scientific  concept  is  observable  is  done  by  Bridgman´s 
operationalism. For that, I consider that random is a concept with observable reference only if 
there  is  an  operation  or  operation  set  to  find  and  measure  such  reference  properly.  The 
operations can be physical or mental. (Bridgman, 1927: 36)
I don’t demand that the concepts have empiric concepts,  this is not the topic concerned. But it  
is demanded that, to have empiric contents, an operating procedure must exist. This guideline is 
restrictive and is effective to decide the empiric concept of the concept “Fate”. Also, it is equal  
to, dealing with this work, other formulations such as Hempel´s: “A statement with the concept  
Fate would  have  the  empiric  meaning  whether  it  was  expressed  in  terms  of  observable  
characteristics of physical objects” (Hempel, 1950:10). 
In short, a concept has an empiric meaning “if we can assign numerical values to particular  
instances of it-if we can , in effect measure it under certain circumstances” (Gillies, 1972:8). If  
not,  “Fate”  won´t  have  this  reference  and  will  build  other  statements,  without  empiric 
foundation.
Without an empiric reference, and out of analytical (tautologies) statements, some few concepts 
can have, however, a positive function in the science. Their functionality would be heuristic: 
basic concepts which give foundation to programs of research and alternative proposals. They 
must, therefore, have principles which let build contrastable and refutable alternative models up. 
The heuristic value of a concept is given in an environment of epistemic doubt, when there isn´t 
a  final  and  complete  solution  to  the  problem  given.  In  that  situation,  the  construction  of 
programs with possible alternative solutions would be essential. The mathematical models are 
refutable, but not concepts such as fate and determination. 
3. The Determinism. 
Following to Ernest Nagel (2006: 371-441) and transmitting what he says about physics to the 
social  sphere,  a set  of  rules  is  deterministic  for a system of variables,  related to  a  kind of  
characteristics,  if  a  phase of  the system determinates unambiguously its  phase at  any other 
moment. The theory lets know what will happen to the considered system, whether we know all 
initial conditions. Indeterminism would be the mathematical model that doesn´t permit us to  
know the following phase of the system accurately. 
It means, the system is deterministic if a function F (model )exists, that knowing the values of 
variable in time T, it gives values to these variables in time T2 and then in time T3 and so on  
(Bricmont,  2004:3).  Once  we  know  the  values  T1,  it  implies  predictability.  Under  the 
assumption “Ceteris Paribus”: the non-included variables in the model don´t move”. 
This definition of determinism let get away from polemic about if determinism and coincidence 
have a necessary relation between them. In my opinion, the coincidence gives an unnecessary 
conceptual complexity. 
4. Random concept and Undecidability. 
I  am  starting  from  the  concept  of  Randomization  kolmogorov-Chaitin  (also  found  as 
Solomonoff). Volchan (2002.60—61) believes that Martin-Löf definition about randomization 
is preferable, but it is equal to that concept. 
Program means instructions (rules) plus input. Elegant program is the smallest one which is able 
to  generate  a  string  of  data.  Data  are  produced randomly if  the  same  string  is  its  elegant  
program. It means, if the available short  program, which generates the string, is as long as the 
string  itself,  it  isn´t  compressible.  “A string  is  random if  no  program of  size  substantially 
smaller than the string itself can generate or describe it” (Volchan, 2003.56, Chaitin, 2004:22). 
Calude (2202)  states,  it  means  the absence  of  a  command or  model.  These  definitions  are 
equivalent. “Intuitively, the slightest possibility to calculate an infinite fraction of a succession 
makes  this  is  not  random”(Mario  Parra  and  Suarez,  2006.  166).  Random  implies 
unpredictability (Calude, 2002).
Consequently,  demonstrating  that  a  string  is  random is  to  probe  that  it  is  its  own  elegant 
program. Proving is not random, it is to find a shorter elegant program. 
This definition leads to what we cannot know if a string is stochastic or not accurately. We can´t 
know because any distribution of data could be done randomly,  despite being more or less 
probable. Throwing a coin, the string “1001101011000” is as probable as “111111111111”: 
both options have a probability of 1/2n   . In this case 1/212. However, we intuitively observe that 
a string has a bigger stochastic appearance. 
Chaitin thinks this characteristic comes from incompleteness of every formal reasoning system, 
so a border is placed to not overcome. Is a random string or it seems only ? We don´t know, it is  
a limitation of the mathematics related with the incompleteness theorem of the formal systems 
minimally  powerful  for  Gödel  (Chaitin,  1975).  This  is  an  accepted  result  by  the  scientific 
mathematical literature. 
The demonstration can be done in different ways, and, as such, it is not subject in this work. The 
base is on the function which decides the complexity of a string (if it is a product of an elegant  
program and what is the size of that program) is not itself  computable, so we cannot accurately  
decide the randomness of a string (Volchan, 2002:2). A similar intuitive approach to Chaitin´s 
(2004:108-110) is as follows. Imagine a formal system FS powerful enough (in the sense of the 
condition of  Gödel´s  Incompleteness  Theroem).  Let´s  use  PE,  a  program which checks the 
elegancy: It takes P as  input and says true  if P is elegant. And false if P is not elegant. Let´s 
imagine the program B takes number N of natural numbers as input and number all program PK 
bigger than N and makes a test PE to find the elegant number, then it executes and gets its 
output. 
If we execute B with N=B+1, then we execute PE over programs whose length is bigger than 
B+1. A PK which is elegant must be found. It is executed and output is got. But the output got is 
the same as the PK , however, it is smaller because it measures N. So it is a contradiction: PK is 
elegant and is not. “If we could prove that a program is elegant, then that would enable to find a 
smaller  program  that  produces  the  same  output,  contradiction!”  (Chaitin,  2004:  109).  In 
conclusio ,  it  isn´t possible to determinate if a program is elegant or not.  Because if it was 
possible, we would go into a contradiction. 
It means, there isn´t an algorithm that we can explain a string of data and answer to the question 
of whether a string is random or not. It is not possible to decide if a string is stochastic or not  
because we cannot prove it.  A demonstration that the string depends on nothing, hasn´t got 
determinant conditions (Nagel, 2006: 438), will never have a short program which generates it, 
would be necessary.  And that  is  not  possible.  We can only watch if  it  seems more or less 
stochastic,  so  we  can  speak  about  pseudo-random  strings  when  they  have  such  statistical 
appearance. This inability to choose is the fundamental and unappealable result. 
It doesn´t exist a final, quantitative and qualitative procedure to find a string of data randomly.  
Nor otherwise. Operationally, it is a concept without operation. Random can have theoretical  
content, empiric approximations but never a complete empiric model 
5. Slutsky-Yale effect. 
Slutsky (1937) asked himself in 1924 (reproduced in 1937 in Econometry) whether random 
fluctuations  may generate  regular  waves.  It  means,  if  strings  with  deterministic  appearance 
(regular) could be, actually, generated by stochastic process. It is said coherent string in which 
the appearance of a value in a position depends on the previous or subsequent values of the 
variable (auto-correlation). An incoherent string doesn´t show this dependence. 
Barnett  (2006) says Slutsky is  defending two proposals.  Firstly,  adding random factors  can 
generate phenomena with  regular waves appearance. It means that the addition introduces in 
mutual  independent  events  an  oscillatory  appearance,  in  which  subsequent  data  have  a 
dependence from the subsequent ones. Secondly, these fluctuations with wave aspect can seem 
cycles which show  apparent regularity. “The summation of random causes may be the source 
of cyclic, or undulatory processes” (Slutsky, 1937:114)
To prove these proposals, Slutsky uses a data mobile addition and tries to demonstrate that  this 
process turns into coherent to incoherent strings. Giving as results, movements with cyclical 
appearance, similar to real economic cycles studied. For that,  he compares the graphic of a  
economic cycle observed with the movement of data, stablished by the selection of a series of 
lottery numbers and doing a mobile addition of twelve. Adding the number of random factors,  
we  will  get,  finally,  to  cyclical  series  equal  to  symmetrical  functions.  Also,  these  wavy 
movements would be identical to studied economic cycles. Slutsky used other procedures with 
similar results. All these methods share the fact of introducing a dependent structure among 
data. 
Slutsky finalizes that has  an inductive proof about the possibility of variable randomly acting 
give a cyclical process in Economy. In general, it is a fact of wavy appearance. Inductive proof  
means it is an example, or several examples, of the possibility, and not a universal deductive 
demonstration. 
Yule (1926) thought about the same idea, referring to the appearance of the cyclical behavior in 
a string that is, actually, the result of stochastic factors. Oscillations which don´t appear in the 
original data. Yule would suggest (Alvarez Vazquez, 1996:320-1) an auto-countdown model for 
the economic cycle or equation in finite differences of second order, with the addition of a 
stochastic process or white sound. 
Y Y Yt t t t= + +− −δ δ ε1 1 2 2
Where the variable Y is related with its delayed values, and  δ are the coefficients. A process of 
white sound ε is a succession of independent values among them and distributed identically. In 
a lax way, a string of values with a zero auto-correlation in every retardations and normality.  
The random coefficients and  shocks are the key, once we get output data. The white sound 
process produce, right now, a string of impacts of cyclical appearance. 
The economic cycle would behave as a pendulum, with a white sound process  εt     hitting the 
pendulum randomly. It would generate a regular movement that is not true. It is calculated to 
solar  spots,  giving a period of 10,6 years. Where this autoregressive  model is similar to a 
process of mobile additions of Slutsky type (Pollock, 1987), so:
 Y t t t q t q= + + +− −µ ε µ ε µ ε0 1 1 . . .  
As  Pallock  explains  (1987),  Slutsky  and  Yale  are  confirming  the  same  type  of  dependent 
process of the random disturbances: “the affinity of the two sorts of process is further confirmed  
when it is recognized that an autoregressive process of finite order is equivalent to a moving-
average process of infinite order and that, conversely, a finite order moving–average process is  
just an infinite-order autoregressive process” (p.8).
Kuznets  (1929)  accepted  the  following  thesis:  series  serially  auto-correlationed  produce, 
through mobile additions, series with auto-correlation. Space and time of the cycles generated 
would depend on the distribution of random shocks and on the period of the mobile addition 
employed. The more elements we include in the series of a mobile addition, the higher the  
internal correlation in the series that we get. Frisch (1931) focused on the way to avoid spurious 
economic cycles. Moran (1950) agrees that applying mobile additions to a random string leads,  
in the limit, to perfect sinuous functions.
It has also raised a second option or interpretation “realistic”: we have a “real” effect (Barnett,  
2006),  it  is  the  addition  of  random “shocks”  what  a  studied  cycled  produces.  So,  studied 
business cycles are explained as the addition of random causes, without the necessity to turn to 
any underlying regular factor which becomes irrelevant. Business cycles would be phenomena 
of  random  foundation.  The  theory  of  real  business  cycles  takes  Slutsky-Yale  effect  as  
foundation,  considering  it  as  tested.  The  macroeconomic  series  would  be  nonstationary 
stochastic  processes,  without  tendency,  by  the  effect  of  real  random  factors.  (Nelson  and 
Plosser, 1982). 
This  problem arises  for  all  data  series  that  present  periodicity.  “All  activities  in  which the 
periodicity  of  time  series  was  involved.  Thus  it  had  direct  relevance  to  all  statistical 
manipulations of data” (Barnett, 2006: 6).
The  result  of  Chaitin  says  every  answer  to  the  Slutsky-Yale  problem  can  only  be  an 
approximation. Never a certainty. We have series of cyclical appearance, in which to know if 
they are a product of random variables falls within Chaitin Undecidability theorem. It is only an 
approximation. 
Likewise, while Slutsky and Yale sharply set out the possibility that the studied cycles have  
random elements produced. 
From now on , the scientific literature has discussed about two different conclusions. The first  
option or interpretation “statistics” (Barnett, 2006) is that we have a statistical effect to bear in  
mind. A result  due to the application of a procedure. Moving averages or others.  A logical 
question arises: if we take a economic series of data and we do an careful study, avoiding a  
procedure of addition or average, can we avoid the problem exposed by Slutsky? If we improve 
the procedures, would we dismiss the generation of possible spurious business cycles?
Likewise, a second option arisen or “realistic” interpretation: we have a “real” effect (Barnett,  
2006): it is the addition of random “shocks” what a studied cycle produces. So, studied business 
cycles explain the addition of random causes, without resorting to any regular underlying effect 
which becomes irrelevant.  Business cycles would be phenomena of random foundation. The 
real  business  cycles  theory  uses  this  Slutsky-Yale  effect  as  a  foundation,  considering  as  
approved. Macroeconomic series would be non-steady stochastic processes, without tendency, 
by the real random effect of factors (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). 
This problem arises for every series of data which have periodicity. “All activities in which the  
periodicity  of  time  series  was  involved.  Tus  it  had  direct  relevance  to  all  statistical  
manipulations of data” (Barnett, 2006:6).
Chaitin  result  tells  us  every answer  to  Slutsky-Yale  answer  can only be an approximation. 
Never a certainty. We have series of cyclical appearance, in which to know if they are product 
of random variables falls within Chaitin Undecidability theorem. It is only an approximation. 
Also, although Slutsky and Yale sharply exposed the possibility that the studied cycles could 
have random elements which they produce, they left out the problem whether the presumably 
stochastic factors were or not. Let´s use the lottery series as an example of random series, it is a 
questionable assumption: because the statistical values of the series don’t fully coincide with the 
probabilistic assumption (Alvarez Vazquez, 1996:310). Alvarez Vazquez tries to prove  that the 
regular cycles are already in the original data of the lottery string. “The cause of the regular  
cycles, studied  in the series of mobile additions, is in the regular movements of the original  
series” (Alvarez Vazquez,  1996,  301).  So,  “the mistake of  the  argument  in  which  Slutsky 
hypothesis lays on would be in assuming  that the string of the first prizes (its last digits) were  
random, when it is only irregular” (Alvarez Vazquez, 2004:98). Since in the frequency field, the 
regular cycles don’t  equally contribute to the variety as they should do in an ideal  random 
series. The mobile average would create or destroy nothing. 
Therefore, the main previous problem to the interpretation is referred to the assumptions arose  
from Slutsky and Yale. Business cycles can be considered deterministic or random, but the  
factors which seem random can be questioned, as predicted Chaitin Undecidability theorem. 
6. Classification of the cycle, determinism and endogenousity theories. 
There isn´t any basic theory accepted by a scientific literature consensus and the discussion 
among alternative research programs is so complex. 
The two main research programs are Keynesian and classic. I have explained their conceptual  
basis. The classic theory uses the form of RBC theory, about the conceptual basis of the rational 
expectations  of  Lucas  and  models  of  general  dynamic  stochastic  DSGE  equilibrium  are 
generated. The conceptual basis is in the general theory of the economic growth which comes 
from Solow , and, when the agents can choose all variables, specially savings, from Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans. The fluctuations of the cycle are necessarily the best answers for the economic 
agents to real exogenous shocks. 
On the Keynasian hand,  from the 80s,  it  has looked for microeconomic fundaments for the 
temporary stiffness of the prices and salaries, and the effects of intuition about the risk in the  
corporate  behaviour.  Coordination  mistakes,  the  imperfect  competence,  the  stiffness  in  the 
assignment mechanism and nominal shocks are studied. 
A part of this Keynesian literature has adopted the DSGE form. In this mathematical model, for 
example Gali and Rabanal (2004), studies demanding random shocks instead of technological 
random shocks. Cho and Cooley (1991) introduced the nominal stiffness in the employment 
contracts.  Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki  (1987)  studied  monopolistic  competition  with  nominal 
stiffness, by contracts whose effect  lasts  in the time.  Hairault  and Portier  (1993)  took into  
account dynamic monopolistic competition with exogenous and random technology and money 
supply. And a long list. Models which link Keynesian principles in classic models. 
Another part of the literature, which has developed DSGE models, is distinguished by adopting 
the principle of indetermination in the evolution to the equilibrium or stationary state, or in the 
same stationary state. A “sunspot” shock, in this literature, is the impact that the expectations of  
the agents have when, not being based on the real evolution of the macroeconomic variables,  
have a final impact in the allocation. It means, it is a random variable that doesn´t affect to the 
economic foundations (endowment, preferences, technology) and isn’t established by them, and 
give that some different balances of consumption and production are possible.
The expectations are auto-predictive: they are done on the mere fact that the agents believe.  
This capacity to have a so important impact comes from the fact that the models are incomplete 
and incorporate  factors  which  expand the  impact.  The  two more  common elements  are  an 
incomplete working market with externalities, where there isn´t a balance between supply and 
demand, and scale economies in production function. Shell (1977) used the simple model of 
generations that comes before Lucas´ one (1972), using Samuelson`s one (1958) to introduce 
“sunspots” shocks which affect to the level of prices. Benhabib and Farmer (2994) proved that 
indetermination  in  a  simple  model  ,  type  DSGE,  with  scale  economy  can  arise.  Multiple 
equilibriums are possible and the final equilibrium is random. In closed models, with complete 
markets,  the  “sunspots”  shocks  would  not  have  impact  because  the  agents  avoid  any  risk 
(Benhabib  and Farmer,  1999).  Otherwise,  if  the  fundamental  variables  give  a  solution,  the 
expectations could not significantly modify the final equilibrium, nor the way to it. 
Called by some authors as “Endogenous Business Cycle theory”, EBC theory, is endogenous 
because includes variables which turn the initial boosts into cyclical movements, whose values 
are decided  within the equational  system. But it still introducing exogenous triggering factors 
(Whitta-jacobsen 2004, Farmer 2012), and the expectations behave in random way and move 
out of the system. 
It is true that the technology is a key variable and the expectations are extrinsic. But there aren’t  
relevant conceptual differences between the impact of the technological factor in the RBC and 
the impact  of  the expectations of the agents in the models EBC, because in both cases are 
exogenous and random.  The “sunspots” factors are added to technological  shocks.  Random 
movements which close the system.”  Deterministic” and “indeterministic” doesn´t have to do 
with  “determinate”  and  “indeterminate”  in  the  EBC  literature.  “We  say  that  the  model  is 
determinate if there is a unique equilibrium and indeterminate if there are multiple equilibria” 
(Mcgougha  et  al.,  2012:  8).  It  means,  it  is  determinate  if  the  model  is  a  solution,  and 
indeterminate if it has several possible options. A RBC model is determinate, in this sense, and, 
however,  is indeterministic in the global defined sense in this work.
The endogenous variables that would transmit and expand the initial shocks, making the cycle,  
would  be,  among many things,  externalities  in  the  production  (Bernabib and Farmer  1994, 
Farmer  and Guo 1994)  ,  complementarities  in  the  intertemporal  election (Azariadis,  1981), 
unfinished labour market, without labor supply (Azariadis, 1981; Farmer and Woodford, 1984), 
risk loans without collateral (Azariadis et al., 2015). An example is Benhabib and Nishimura 
(1996), with a model in which the expectations about the marginal value of the investments 
cause the double effect in increasing this investment, but , at the same time, reducing, through 
externalities of the labour market  and leisure growth, with a final indeterminate effect. 
For  Farmer  (2012)  and  Farmer  and  Platonov  (2016)  the  EBC  models  that  involve 
indetermination in the way to steady state, if determinate, are conceptually based on the classic 
theory. A function of beliefs closes the models and explains the stiffness of prices, in a context  
of rational expectations. The models which have, also, an indetermination in the steady state 
would  be  based  on  Keynesians  foundations,  producing  the  possible  involuntary  long-term 
unemployment.  However,  the  decisive  factor  lies  on  indeterministic  models  in  which  the 
expectations develop randomly and are decisive. 
Thinking about these theories, I consider the model of the cycle can be classified according to 
two principles. If endogenous mechanisms about explanation of the cycle are introduced or not. 
And if  the  explanation is  deterministic  or  probabilistic.  Determinism and probabilism have 
already been defined. One or more auto-regressive equations ,which have one or more white  
noise processes, are used to be introduced in the stochastic models.
Endogenous variables are those whose value is  determinate in the mathematical  model:  the 
variables determinate among themselves. Exogenous variables use non-fixed values within the 
system of equations. Exogenous variables can be random or deterministic, if their development 
hasn´t got observable or postulated model, or if they have it. The endogenous variables must be  
deterministic, because , from a value, el model determines the following. 
Moreover, it is necessary to discriminate between a trigger factor of the cycle and mechanisms 
of spread and persistence. A trigger factor is the movement which causes the first variation in  
macroeconomic variables. In the RBC theory,  it  is a exogenous technological shock. In the 
Keynesian theory, it can be a change in the expectation of marginal productivity of capital.  
Spread mechanism is the evolution of variables that cause the business cycle in the sense of  
persistent, continued and correlated  movement of the macroeconomic variables. In the RBC 
theory, it is the inter-temporal replacement of leisure for work. In the Keynesian theory, it is the 
temporal stiffness of prices and/or salaries, and the perception of risk of the companies. 
In this classification, every research  model or program can be placed as follows. The RBC  
theory  and the  before  models  to  DSGE are  exogenous  and  probabilistic  in  trigger  factors.  
Technological shocks, if they behave in stochastic way. And endogenous one, in the spread 
mechanisms: decisions of replacement of leisure for work along the time. 
The classic theory, prior to RBC, problems of information, business competence and economic 
policies were admitted as spread variables. They have been added again. 
The Keynesian and neokeynesian theories don´t start from a representative agent or maximizing 
agents inter-temporally, but from macroeconomic variables in an holistic approach. Except, the 
school of thoughts that uses DSGE models. But these approaches, to belong to this research 
program, must  share the conceptual foundation:  exogenous and deterministic theories in the 
trigger  factors.  The  models  of  accelerator-multiplier  are  an  exception  because  they  are 
endogenous.  There  is  a  drop  in  the  aggregate  demand,  generally  isn’t  described  but 
deterministic. A stochastic mathematical model about this initial reduction is not raised And 
endogenous in the spread mechanisms. A process of failures of market, with limitations in the 
factor,  monetary  and/or  good markets.  Slow and pricey  adjustments  in  prices  and salaries, 
productive externalities, nominal shocks, imperfect competition (Standler, 1994). 
Finally, EBC models or of “sunspots” factors would display random exogenous trigger factors. 
Auto-predictive expectations, but also technology that acting on the basis of incomplete markets 
and economies of scale determine the result of such markets.  And, in consequence, the cycle. 
RBC models but unfinished. 
7. Some mathematical developments in the theory of the cycle. 
The starting  keynesian  models  caused  endogenous  and deterministic  cycles,  in  regular  and 
temporal waves. They were based on the ideas of the multiplier and accelerator. 
About  Samuelson´s  model  (1958),  Hicks designs the  theory with explosive macroeconomic 
movements, but it causes continuous cycles by the existence of floor and ceiling. 
 
Idea of the multiplier: 
C c Yt t= ⋅ − 1  (3)
Invesment is the induced addition (accelerator) and the autonomous one (independent from the 
system): 
I I It t t= +
' ' '  (4)
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Being National income, Yt, the addition of consume and investment. 
Model that generates a difference equation of second order. If v=1 ,we have regular oscillations.  
If  v  1  , we have divergent oscillations, in an explosive model that is what Hicks believes 
more probable ( Samuelson disagreed). If v  1 , they are convergent oscillations. 
Divergent oscillations will produce regular and deterministic cycles by the existence of floor 
and ceiling,  which make the movements  to  go bouncing (in  a  model  which stopped being 
lineal). The floor is the accelerator retention which makes the induced investment turn negative 
and equal  to the  depreciation.  And the ceiling is  the potential  product  or  full  employment,  
determined by the quantity of productive factors and the existing technology.
The regularity of the fluctuations is the product of a deterministic model but it doesn´t seem 
supported in data. Although it could be argued that ceteris paribus cycles occur, so other factors 
may be changing the frequency. We have the challenge of introducing such variables. 
Later Keynesian models were divided about the trigger factor. Some models still include an 
endogenous and deterministic factor. Others don’t allow anticipate the first fact which triggers 
that  market  failure.  And in this sense,  the models are incomplete.  But randomization is not  
postulated  and later  mechanism is  deterministic.  Finally,  there  are  models  which  introduce 
exogenous and random demand models , but it is debatable that they fall within this approach. 
In  all  cases,  the  idea  which  links  them  lays  on  what  the  balance  of  the  market   can  be 
unreachable, in an irreversible way, without ad hoc interventions of public policies. The cycle  
would be a natural fact of economy. 
The fact the Keynesian models are divided because of  introducing exogenous and endogenous 
factors comes from Keynes´ thought. Keynes (1936) explained the cause of the economic cycles  
was the movement in the marginal efficiency of the capital. But it didn´t deal with an  automatic 
mechanism, nor necessarily cyclical because the key wasn´t only the marginal value to the last  
invested currency unit,  but also the perception we have of this performance. . What in later 
literature is sometimes called “animal spirits”. Keynes claimed in his General Theory, 1936, the 
possible impact of expectations: “it is not so easy to revive the marginal efficiency of capital,  
determined, as it is, by the uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of the business world” 
(Keynes, 2008:288). The return of confidence would be a difficult factor to manage (Minsky, 
1986). 
Market  failures would provoke non-efficient situations in Pareto terms.  There is  not market 
emptiness.  Goods without  being sold,  unemployed work,  idle  capital.  The economic agents 
would like to be in another transfer point, but they can´t. Recessions would produce a lower 
social  welfare,  and  in  them,  there  are  economic  agents  that  could  improve  without  being 
detrimental to others. As  opposed to this classic school of thought which defends that Economy 
is  always in  an ideal  Pareto situation.  The cycle  would have as  last  explanation,  monetary 
factors (nominal variables) which work in necessary way , from a first trigger factor. There isn´t  
classic dichotomy. 
As an example,  the simple model  exposed by Romer (2006) about  stiffness prices,  flexible  
wages, competitive labour market. 
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Maximum Y exists. π is the price level, L is the number of workers and Lº is the labor supply, 
which is  growing referring to  the  real  wage.  The production function depends on the only  
productive factor which is work, and it has positive labor productivity, but decreasing. The labor 
demand is determined by the points which meet that the labor marginal productivity is similar to 
the real wage. 
The stochastic factor doesn´t exist in this model. The evolution is again deterministic. But the 
trigger cause must be necessarily exogenous. An initial moving in demand develops a cut in the 
income  Y.  The  model  doesn´t  generate  steady  cycles,  so  a  continued  mechanism  which 
provokes imbalances is left. 
Some  alleged  neo-Keynesian  theories  mix,  by  contrary,  stiffness  in  prices  and  wages,  
oligopolistic factors with random shocks of technological and monetary character (e.g., Hairault 
and Portier, 1993). 
Lucas (1972) develops a theory of the cycle in a conceptual classic context. The cause of the  
economic cycle would be the imperfect information related to the prices. The agents would 
believe, erroneously, that general movements in the level of prices are movements in relative  
prices, taking decisions to increase the production, and labor demand and generating cycles. 
Investments based on an incorrect prevision of prices lead, first to boom and later to bust. It  
deals with an exogenous and random theory. The difference between the price of the sector and 
the real price  follows a stochastic evolution: 
p pj t t j t= + ε (10)
Where  j  refers  to  a  good,  pt is  the  general  level  of  prices.  The price  of  the  good (sector) 
stochastically varies according to the general  level  of  prices,  since ε is  a white sound.  The  
supply of each company depends on the expectation that the evolution of prices of its products 
has, against the general level of prices. The bigger dispersion of prices of the sectors according 
to  the  general  prices,  the  bigger  differences  will  be  given  and  more  cycles.  This  is  the 
institutional component which expands or reduces the exogenous shocks. Although it is difficult 
to think this mechanism is enough to generate studied fluctuations in real variables (Mankiw, 
1989). 
In the classic or walrasian theories, the agents behave rationally, in such way that a position of 
equilibrium is always placed (e.g. kydland and Prescott, 1982). Changes in nominal variables 
are immediately adapted: general movements in the price level don´t modify the supply and 
demand equilibrium (Lucas, 1977). It is an efficient Pareto situation, the economic cycles would 
be  efficient  and  optimum  positions  of  the  economic  system  (Long  and  Plosser,  1983). 
Unemployment is never involuntary. 
 
We  get  to  the  so  called  classic  dichotomy  (Mankiw,  1989:80).  The  monetary  supply  is  
exogenous,  the  monetary  demand is  determined by  the  output  level  and  price  level,  but  it  
doesn’t  operate  in  the  walrasian  equilibrium.  Real  and  nominal  variables  don’t  influence 
between them because money doesn´t impact on resource allocation, monetary variations leave 
to the real variables unchanged. 
It is unavoidable that the Walrasian school of thought, focused on the general inter-temporal 
equilibrium: where the possibility disequilibrium in markets is excluded, explains the economic 
cycles from exogenous factors which impact in a random way. Randomness is the necessary 
motor of the studied cycles. Among these factors, the main one is in technological changes 
(technology is  empirically  quantified  as  productivity  of  all  factors  totality,  within  a  Solow 
quantification  of  growth).  Productivity  would  move  randomly giving  the  studied  economic 
cycles (Standler,  1994:1752).  Recession would be a period where productivity capacities of 
society have fallen. Other secondary variables exist such as movements in consumers´ tastes.
Exogenous and stochastic movements modify relative prices and force rational agents to adjust 
labor supply and consumption level. This is the mechanism of transmission which gives depth 
and cycle persistence. What it leads to changes in produced quantities. New decisions about the  
job offered (decisions about how much leisure must be sacrificed along the labor life) are the 
key. The mechanisms of transmission turn the punctual and stochastic shocks into persistent  
cycles. 
Unemployment grows in recessions because people decide to sacrifice less leisure, because the 
labor productivity and real wage have gone down (relative cost of  leisure).  It  is decided to 
change current work for future.  Labor supply is reduced. National output falls.  However, this 
mechanism should be weak. An increase in real wage give bigger value to work (price effect), 
but also the income increases (income effect). An slowdown gives less value to work, but also it 
generates a downfall in income, giving a positive boost to the labor supply which counters, at 
least partially, to replacement effect. So, even if the real wage behaved in a pro-cyclical way, its 
impact would be reduced. 
Other  mechanisms  of  transmission:  goods  in  stock  that  the  company  keeps,  decisions  of 
investment  which  affect  to  the  capital  stock,  delays  in  process  of  investments.  The  global 
weakness  in  mechanisms  of  transmissions  explain  the  introduction  of  nominal  shocks  and 
stiffness of Keynesian inspiration.
Mathematically, these models vary about structure and common assumptions: neoclassic model 
of capital accumulation to which stochastic models of productivity are added. About rational  
expectations  and market  emptiness,  families  maximize  a  function  of  usefulness,  companies 
maximize a function of benefits.  Shock expand themselves and persist  by the intertemporal 
substitution of work and leisure, and by the impact about investment and the capital shock.
The model of Long and Plosser (1983) is one of the paradigmatic contributions of RBC theory,  
it consists of:
- A function of Cobb-Douglas production, with neoclassic conditions. 
- A technology which evolves with deterministic temporal tendency and an additional 
random  perturbation  which  behaves  as  an  auto-regressive  of  first  order   (AR(1)) 
process, and white noise εt variable is also added. 
- A representative consumer who maximizes a  usefulness that depends on consumption 
and leisure (so, on work), limited by the budget constraint which relates consumption 
with work. 
- A closed economy is supposed. 
- The rate of accumulation in  capital,  which depends on the national  output,  and the  
savings rate. 
- Facilitating assumptions which make the savings rate and labor supply fixed.
In this model, the process AR(1) in technology generates a solution for the national product “per  
capita” of AR (2), or auto-regressive process of second order:
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Where α is the participation of capital in the national income (exponent in the function of Cobb-
Douglas production), δ is the auto-regressive coefficient of the technological perturbations. The 
variables  are  expressed in  cyclical  values,  data  without  tendency.  The second parameter  is  
negative, what it generates cycles. 
In RBC models, the technological progress is exogenous and, also, must be. According to Euler 
theorem, since capital and work are rival factors which gain, in competence, the same as their  
marginal product. So: 
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There are no resources to pay the technological progress, so it must be necessarily endogenous 
(sala-i-Martin, 1994:42-43). The economic growth is at long-term, and the cycles are explained 
by non-explained changes nor explainable by the technology. 
Romer (2006) presents a standar RBC model characterized by the following equations, with a 
function of neutral Cobb-Douglas production of Harrod. 
Y K A Lt t t t=
−α α( ) 1 (13)
Y C I Gt t t t= + + (14)
The evolution of capital comes determined by :
K K I Kt t t t+ = + −1 δ (15)
Technology follows a growing temporal tendency and it is subjected  to random shocks: 
A e A g t A= + +0 * (16)
A At t t* = +−ρ ε1 (17)
Where  g is the coefficient of temporal growing in technology, y  − 〈 〈1 1ρ .  ε t  is a process of 
White noise. A t * is the neoclassic component in technology, again AR(1). It can be reduced to 
a weighted sum of different random process in a potentially infinite sucession.
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Later, introducing in the production function, we have:
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All technological shocks have long-term effect. 
The mechanism of propagation, work and leisure decisions, is understood from utility function 
of a representative agent which relates consumption c and work l, with the restriction of wage w 
and real interest rate r.
U c b l= + −l n l n ( )1 (20)
With the restriction : c
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Getting , in a scenery of some temporal periods, to the expression:
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Where ρ is the discount rate. The labor supply in every period responds to the corresponding 
wage, but also to the interest rate. But in the model,  interest rates and relative salaries evolve in  
opposite directions, offsetting  their effects on intertemporal substitutions between leisure and 
work: on the labor supply. 
Finally, Walrasian school of thought hasn´t explained nor The Great Depression of 1929, nor  
the great recession of 2008 (Farmer, 2012). Also, some regularities in data must be explained, 
they don´t seem coherent with the theoretical model. Firstly, a recession is related with less  
consumption  and  more  leisure.  What  is  difficult  to  understand  being  both  goods  normal 
(Mankiw, 2989:82). The only one explanation of this phenomenon, for the model, would be in 
which the real wage goes down. But there are less workers in a recession, its labor marginal  
productivity goes up and therefore, the real wage should also go up. That would be anti-cyclical.  
One of the facts to explain the theory of business endogenous cycles or with “sunspots” shocks 
(Schmitt-Grohe, 2000).
Secondly, neither pro-cyclical movements of prices. It is a polemic about Philips curve at short 
and long term. So, this school of thought tries empirically to prove that prices don´t behave in  
this way.
Thirdly,  real  cycle  theory says  currency fluctuations  are  based on the variations  of  money 
demand for transactions (king and Plosser,  1984) .  But  it  is questionable the inexistence of 
movements, in some cases, independent from the central bank or other factors. 
To which two fundamental problems are added. On the one hand, big technological shocks aren
´t detected empirically to explain big recessions. On the other hand, can the productivity or  
technological possibility of the economic system be allied as if it hasn´t got any relationship 
with it? It is true that full productivity of factors ranges in time (Prescott, 1986) and behaves in a 
pro-cyclical way dropping in recessions. But: Is it the factor that provokes the crisis, or is it the 
result because the crisis gives low return sub-employments to workers and an important part of 
the leisure capital? It deals with a theoretical problem, since it is impossible to make empirically 
a difference between cause and effect. 
After all, one of the neoclassic growing models of criticism is technology is placed as a main 
factor of growing, but it is unexplained and unexplainable. Kondratieff and Stolper thought the 
technical  fluctuations  are  not  random  and  have  the  economic  development  as  origin.  The 
technique will evolve at the wavy long-term rhythm. Thus, they state a serious mistake would 
be  to  think  the  direction  and  intensity  of  findings  and  inventions  is  “accidental”  (p.112).  
Considering technical  changes are given randomly lacks of basis,  being rather a product  of 
economic necessities (p.112). 
It seems, therefore, difficult to keep that technology is exogenous and not endogenous. In such 
way,  the  cycles  would generate  endogenously,  at  least,  a  part  of  technological  oscillations.  
Endogenous technological growth models should be introduced, for example Romer´s model 
(1986) among many others. 
If  the  endogeneity of  technological  fluctuations  is  subject  of  discussion,  public  spending is 
much more. Its endogenous and anticyclical character, according to automatic stabilizers and to 
the evolution of tax capacity, is clear. 
At last,  the investigation program, that  comes from DSGE models and adds “sunspots, ” is  
there. The indetermination means the model is not closed and a number of endless possible 
equilibriums can be given. This indetermination had been traditionally considered as a weakness 
of the model, which should be avoided. However, this element is used in this program as a key 
to explain business cycles (and other empiric facts such as the transmissions of monetary boosts 
and economic growth) as Benhabib and Farmer (1999) defend. Azariadis (1981) presented a 
Lucas  model  (1972)  of  simple  economy  with  succeeding  generations,  under  extrinsic 
uncertainty. 
Beliefs about the future will determinate the final equilibrium in these incomplete models that 
don’t give any solution but a set of possible equilibriums. Beliefs that act randomly, prediction 
is impossible. Benhabib and Farmer (1999) present a simplified model which must be valid for  
different exposed models, along the way of the balanced growth. We have in this model: 
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Where “y” is the vector of endogenous variables, “x” is the vector of economic policy variables, 
“u  and v”  are  stochastic  shocks.  A,  B,  C and D are  parameters.  Equations  must  meet  the 
conditions to get the emptying of markets. 
It  is  observed  that  this  model  introduces  two  white  noise  processes,  accompanying  an 
expectation about  future.  If  the  rational  expectation hypothesis  is  accepted in  a  uncertainty 
situation: the agents exactly know the model but they don´t know the exact value of parameters. 
Using an adaptive learning in the agents, by which they suppose the values in t+1 will be the  
same than in t, and introducing values of x1 expressed as the result of random present and  and 
heavy perturbations: 
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Where the values yt and yt-1 are equal and therefore a temporal equilibrium happens. 
Consequently, rational agents, adaptive learning, temporal equilibrium, the final solution would 
be an addition of random perturbations in time. We are in the same intellectual schedule of RBC 
models. 
Duffy and Xiao (2005) study if a RBC (DSGE) model of equilibrium with rational expectations, 
in a reduced way, and with a dynamic of adaptive learning, can generate an undetermined and  
stable equilibrium. Indetermination lets non-fundamental variables “sunspots” boost the model 
and generate cycles (Farmer and Guo, 1994). 
Under rational and adaptive expectations, the agents identify the model but not the exact value 
of the coefficients. The equilibrium will be stable if the estimating of the coefficients keeps a 
close and sustained setting of the real coefficients. It means, if the differential equation is locally 
stable. 
d a
d T
T a a= −( ) (28)
Where “a” are the estimated coefficients and “T(a)” are the real coefficients. 
Duffy and Xiao (2005) analyze the solutions of the three more relevant models : Farmer and 
Guo (1994), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and Wen (1998). They study the conditions under 
which RBC models with “sunspots” shocks and rational expectations  get undetermined and 
stable equilibriums. 
The reduced model exposed by Duffy and Xiao (2005) is: 
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Where “k” is the capital shock and “c” is the consumption one.  The coefficients are “a”. The 
impact of expectations on the consumption is determinant and therefore, on the investment and 
evolution of the capital shock. The expectations are formed in an autoregressive process AR(1). 
y b b y b st t t t= + + +−1 2 1 3 ε (31)
The vector of endogenous,  capital  and consumption variables is “y”. the vector of extrinsic  
expectations is “s”, “ε” is white sound. The typical autoregressive progress, with accumulation 
of stochastic boosts, of the RBC (DSGE)models is observed. 
It is a model similar to the used one, to analyze the same problem, by McGough et al. (2013).  
Those who modify in the first equation  kt+1 by  Et k  t+1  = al k  t+ a2 ct   ,  introduce “e”  in the 
second equation to the capital shock in time “t”. 
c a k a E k a E ct t t t t t+ = ++ +5 3 1 4 1 (32)
Duffy and Xiao (2005) reach the following conclusion. Under adaptive learning, in RBC models 
with “sunspots” shocks, restrictions in parameters avoid undetermined and stable equilibriums 
simultaneously. Agents don´t get the expectation and parameters to bring closer to their real  
values. The coefficient a4 must be negative (nothing credible: the consumer wants to maintain a 
steady path of consumption) to get  stability,  but  it  must  be positive to get  indetermination.  
Economy is either stable and determined or unstable and undetermined. Or the idea of rational 
expectations would not hold.  McGough et al.  (2013) maintain the condition that  a4  must be 
negative. And Benhabib and Farmer (1994) condition: the demand curve has positive slope and 
higher  in absolute value than the labor supply curve.  They are  empiric  and theoretically  is 
hardly plausible. In conclusion, however, it is limited to some existing models so far. 
8. Conclussions
The classic theory has produced the real RBC business cycle theory and the stochastic models 
of general dynamic DSGE equilibrium. These models state the business cycles are the result of  
random and exogenous variables. These factors are used because their conceptual fundament is  
the  theory  of  Walrasian  equilibrium,  throughout  neoclassic  models  of  economic  growth. 
Rational agents will  always take decisions that empty markets,  in positions of Pareto boost. 
Hence they use a realistic interpretation of Slutsky-Yale effect. On the one hand, the economic 
growth is based on random exogenous factor unexplained and unexplainable. On the other hand, 
a real random movement behind the fluctuating image of the empiric cycle is equally presented. 
The theory of the cycle is unable to predict and with great difficulties to explain big recessions 
and some macroeconomic correlations. 
In this scheme, the “sunspots” shocks involve the addition of stochastic extrinsic variables, but 
don´t modify the conceptual base, nor the mathematical models. With the problem of making 
compatible the indetermination and the stability. 
 Keynesian theory explains the business cycle as positions of disequilibrium, in which markets  
don´t empty, nor get a situation of Pareto boost. Keynesian classic models establish endogenous 
and  deterministic  focuses,  producing  regular  cycles.  Its  main  problem  lays  on  they  aren´t  
apparently compatible with the studied business cycles, with an irregular deepness, time and 
recurrence. Thanks to inapplicability of the “ceteris paribus” term is possible to explain, but 
then the target is to incorporate unknown factors gradually. As Russell (1914: 230) points when 
the constant relationship among groups of facts fails at a certain moment, “it is usually possible 
to discover a new, more constant relation by enlarging the group”.
The  later  Keynesian  theory  has  kept  the  conceptual  heart  which  states  the  markets  cannot 
empty, and the involuntary unemployment is possible at long-term; but it was made removable 
models.  On  the  one  hand,  microeconomic  fundaments  have  been  looked  for  the  temporal 
stiffness of prices and the uncertainty of the noticed risk. Leaving the beginning of cycles to an  
initial change in the effect demand, exogenous, and a determined change would be supposed. 
The adopted operationalist approach demands the existence of a measure procedure, to have an 
empiric content,  which establishes the observable reference with accuracy.  Approach which 
requires from the random concept, and therefore, from the determinism as univocal relationship 
with the system values over time. But Chaitin theorems show that the random concept doesn´t 
give that measure procedure: we cannot know certainly if a set of data accomplish or not, so it is  
necessary to conclude that it is strictly a theoretical concept. Equally, the determinism is so. The 
statements that use random process, or deny them to assert deterministic strings lack of empiric 
reference: they cannot, and will never do, be verified nor falsified with accuracy. 
As statements and equations used in concepts or variables related with the random concept,  
positive  or  negative,  don´t  have  empiric  reference,  nor  own  definition  value  or  tautology 
(because information is added); only heuristic value can be owned. They would be research 
proposals. We can suppose the studied data are produced by a deterministic model. And we can 
also suppose, by contrary, that they are produced by a set of  random variables.  The theory 
determines these assumptions. It is empirically impossible to decide between both possibilities. 
So, they are not approved statements, but research proposals. 
Random and determinism would  be,  therefore,  two contrary  programs which  help  to  build 
models, evaluable theoretically and contrasting quantitatively. More or less plausible. Even with 
clear reprehensible results, in some cases, from the coherence with the general theory , and from 
sets  of  data.  But  the  selection and possible rejection of  models  do not  imply the final  and 
definitive answer to the problem if the cyclical phenomena behave in one way or another. It is 
an untouchable limit of the human knowledge. 
The  historic  discussion  between models  of  the  stochastic  business  cycles  and deterministic 
models do not get to a conclusion. As in any other scientific field which uses these concepts as 
research projects. 
Finally, if we ask science to predict, or at least we consider it useful if it does,  with the final  
goal to avoid mistakes in economic policies, then, deterministic theories give a step forward to 
the usefulness of science. The models of the cycle and the growth of the classic theory cannot 
predict. Keynesian models with endogenous factors and deterministic evolution make up a more 
ambitious proposal. 
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